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 1859
FROM NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND TO EVERY STUDENT 
SUCCEEDS: 
BACK TO A FUTURE FOR EDUCATION FEDERALISM 
Michael Heise∗ 
When passed in 2001, the No Child Left Behind Act represented 
the federal government’s most dramatic foray into the elementary and 
secondary public school policymaking terrain. While critics emphasized 
the Act’s overreliance on standardized testing and its reduced school-
district and state autonomy, proponents lauded the Act’s goal to close 
the achievement gap between middle- and upper-middle-class students 
and students historically ill served by their schools. Whatever structural 
changes the No Child Left Behind Act achieved, however, were largely 
undone in 2015 by the Every Student Succeeds Act, which repositioned 
signiﬁcant federal education policy control in state governments. From 
a federalism standpoint, the Every Student Succeeds Act may have reset 
education federalism boundaries to favor states, far exceeding their po-
sition prior to 2001. 
While federal elementary and secondary education reform efforts 
since 2001 may intrigue legal scholars, a focus on educational federal-
ism risks obscuring an even more fundamental development in educa-
tional policymaking power: its migration from governments to families, 
from regulation to markets. Amid a multidecade squabble between fed-
eral and state lawmakers over education policy authority, efforts to 
harness individual autonomy and market forces in the service of 
increasing children’s educational opportunity and equity have grown. 
Persistent demands for and increased availability of school voucher pro-
grams, charter schools, tax credit programs, and homeschooling dem-
onstrate families’ desire for greater agency over decisions about their 
children’s education. Parents’ calls for greater control over critical 
decisions concerning their children’s education and schooling options may 
eclipse state and federal lawmakers’ legislative squabbles over educa-
tional federalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From a formal legal perspective, the initial years of the twenty-ﬁrst 
century unmasked the nation’s growing uncertainty about K–12 educ-
ation federalism. America’s long and deep tradition of local control over 
general education policy began to erode as the federal government en-
tered discrete K–12 regulatory spaces, largely incident to President 
Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty.1 Despite discrete federal regulatory 
pockets targeting speciﬁc challenges to identiﬁable student subpools, 
through the end of the twentieth century, few contested the point that, 
in general, education policymaking fundamentally remained a state and 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See, e.g., Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015) 
(reauthorizing and amending the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) that 
was initially enacted in 1965). For a recent discussion of Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 and its purposes, see James S. Liebman & Michael 
Mbikiwa, Every Dollar Counts: In Defense of the Obama Department of Education’s 
“Supplement Not Supplant” Proposal, 117 Colum. L. Rev. Online 36, 38–41 (2017), 
http://columbialawreview.org/content/every-dollar-counts-in-defense-of-the-obama-department- 
of-educations-supplement-not-supplant-proposal/ [http://perma.cc/LAG6-Q7MD]. 
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local enterprise.2 This allocation of policymaking authority largely tracked 
the dominance of state and local financial contributions to school budgets.3 
The emergence of the twenty-ﬁrst century, however, coincided with 
Congress enacting the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) and singularly 
upending traditional education federalism boundaries. While different 
people may have had different perspectives on NCLB, few contested its 
dramatic implications for K–12 education federalism in general and its 
signiﬁcant expansion of the federal footprint in particular.4 Simply put, 
NCLB profoundly reshaped education federalism boundaries when it 
became law in 2001. Notwithstanding its profound implications for 
education federalism, however, NCLB did not fundamentally dislodge 
the primacy of state and local funding for most school budgets. 
Despite not yet having fully digested NCLB and its implications for a 
more robust federal inﬂuence in K–12 education, Congress, once again, 
dramatically readjusted education federalism lines in 2015. The enact-
ment of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) not only unwound 
federal shifts achieved through NCLB but also may have shifted K–12 
policymaking authority back to the states and local districts more so than 
before NCLB, according to some scholars.5 ESSA’s relative infancy makes 
it difficult to assess with accuracy how it will mature and evolve over time. 
While ESSA’s efficacy as a matter of policy remains similarly unclear at 
this time, what is already quite clear, however, is ESSA’s effect on 
education federalism. To complicate education federalism matters further, 
at the same time that Congress toggled between NCLB and ESSA and 
unsettled vertical separation of power understandings, the executive 
branch disrupted long-standing horizontal separation of power balances 
with two “Dear Colleague” letters issued by the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights.6 Quite aside from—but nonetheless 
related to—the dramatic shifts in education federalism boundaries 
themselves, a related point involves the increased velocity and rapidity of 
such dramatic reassignments of policymaking authority between the 
                                                                                                                           
 2. See generally Natalie Gomez-Velez, Public School Governance and Democracy: 
Does Public Participation Matter?, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 297, 301–08 (2008) (summarizing 
increasing federal involvement in public education over the course of the twentieth century). 
 3. See infra Table 1. 
 4. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 Wash. 
U. L. Rev. 959, 966 (2015) [hereinafter Robinson, Disrupting] (“NCLB represents the 
most expansive education reform law in the history of the United States.”). 
 5. See generally Derek W. Black, Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The 
Every Student Succeeds Act, 105 Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Black, 
Abandoning] (manuscript at 131–33) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that 
“whatever federal leadership and leverage the NCLB provided, the ESSA largely eliminates 
it” and that ESSA “moves the Elementary and Secondary Education Act backward, 
transforming more of the existing funds into block grants,” which allow states more 
discretion). 
 6.  See infra section I.B. 
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federal and state and local governments over education policymaking 
authority. 
After brieﬂy describing these important shifts in K–12 education 
federalism, this Essay takes a step back in an effort to gain some 
perspective and helpful context. Greater analytic distance from the 
admittedly important federalism changes achieved through relatively 
recent—and dramatic—congressional and executive activity ushers into 
sharp relief one important yet underappreciated point: While federal 
and state governments continue to squabble over federalism turf in the 
K–12 domain, a more profound shift in education authority—a shift from 
governments (local, state, and federal) to parents—is well underway and 
increasing in velocity. While many legal scholars, including constitutional 
and education policy scholars, understandably focus on the vertical and 
horizontal separation of power dimensions raised by a succession of 
federal legislation and administrative activities,7 such a focus risks 
obscuring an equally, if not more, important long-term shift in K–12 
education policymaking authority. 
Evidence of an even more profound transfer of control over critical 
education decisionmaking authority from governments to parents and 
families abounds. The growing demand for charter schools, school 
voucher programs, tax credit programs, and homeschooling—indepen-
dently and collectively—suggests that families have an almost unquench-
able thirst for greater agency when it comes to decisions about their 
children’s education.8 To be sure, many scholars note the growth of 
school choice in the education context.9 Similarly, education federalism 
scholarship also continues to grow.10 What these two distinct literatures 
miss, however, is how the former literature implicates the latter. 
Speciﬁcally, while federal and state governmental officials persist with an 
education federalism “tug-of-war” and Congress and the Department of 
Education squabble over policy turf, these governmental units are 
                                                                                                                           
 7. See, e.g., Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 105–06); Kristi L. 
Bowman, The Failure of Education Federalism, 51 Mich. J.L. Reform (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 7) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Michael Heise, The Political 
Economy of Education Federalism, 56 Emory L.J. 125, 130–35 (2006) [hereinafter Heise, 
Political Economy]; Robinson, Disrupting, supra note 4, at 963; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, 
The High Cost of Education Federalism, 48 Wake Forest L. Rev. 287, 331 (2013) 
[hereinafter Robinson, High Cost]. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Schools, Vouchers, and the American Public 21 (2001); 
Michael Heise, Choosing Equal Educational Opportunity: School Reform, Law, and Public 
Policy, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113, 1126 (2001); Michael W. McConnell, Governments, 
Families, and Power: A Defense of Educational Choice, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 847, 847 (1999); 
James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 Yale L.J. 
2043, 2063–64 (2002); Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support 
“Public” Schools, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 909, 922 (2007). 
 10. See, e.g., Heise, Political Economy, supra note 7, at 126–27; Robinson, High Cost, 
supra note 7, at 287. 
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ﬁghting over a shrinking slice of the education policy pie. That is, while 
intra-government federalism battles over policymaking authority persist, 
parents are increasingly demanding and receiving greater control over at 
least one critical education decision: where their kids will attend school. 
A reduction in real and perceived access to quality schooling partly fuels 
parents’ increased demand for agency over where their kids will attend 
school. Moreover, technological advances combine with a growing supply 
of high quality educational and teaching materials and ready-to-use 
curricula to make homeschooling an increasingly plausible option for a 
greater number of families.11 These factors may also disrupt existing 
methods of the production and distribution of education services. 
While the full array of policy implications of an important shift in 
authority over school assignments from governments to parents remains 
far from clear, the rough contours of a few tentative consequences have 
emerged. One likely consequence is that while federal and state govern-
ments may succeed in retaining decisionmaking and policy control over 
the operation of public and private schools, public officials can no longer 
simply assume the same level of control over decisions about which 
students will attend which schools (public, private, or homeschools). 
Increased parental authority over school choice decisions complicates 
governments’ decisions relating to school ﬁnance. Increased parental 
control also contributes to and reﬂects an increased degree of consum-
erism in the education space, as well as an increased desire to lever 
market forces in the service of education, whether public or private. 
Finally, increased parental consumerism and a greater inﬂuence of mar-
ket forces in the education space will likely continue to both inform and 
disrupt how education services are presently produced and distributed. 
This Essay unfolds as follows. Part I describes how federalism and 
separation of power boundaries in the education context remain both 
ﬂuid and increasingly contested, and it places recent federal forays into 
elementary and secondary education into their proper historical context. 
Part II notes the steady growth of parental choices in the school setting 
over time and the persistence of its growth despite the enduring 
jurisdictional squabbles among federal, state, and local governments over 
education policy. Part III develops the claim that a focus on vertical and 
horizontal separation of power concerns in general and education feder-
alism in particular risks missing a more profound change in the educa-
tion policy landscape. Specifically, parents’ growing calls for greater agency 
and control over their children’s education and school options will likely 
eclipse political ﬁghting over education federalism in terms of impor-
tance. The Conclusion notes that the migration of control over educ-
ation control from all levels of government to parents and students 
represents a profound structural reallocation of power between govern-
                                                                                                                           
 11. See infra section II.A.3. 
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ments and their citizens when it comes to elementary and secondary 
education. 
I. EDUCATION FEDERALISM’S DYNAMIC FLUIDITY 
Despite a tradition, or at least a conventional myth, of local control 
that dominated education federalism for decades,12 federalism bound-
aries are increasingly noted for their ﬂuidity in the public education 
sector. Not only are federalism boundaries becoming increasingly ﬂuid, 
but the pace of change to these boundaries has also quickened over time, 
no doubt a reﬂection of increasingly contested federalism claims. Since 
the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, for example, two separate federal 
laws, the No Child Left Behind Act of 200113 and Every Student Succeeds 
Act of 2015,14 dramatically restructured the balance of power between 
the federal government and state and local governments. In addition, two 
separate “Dear Colleague” letters involving the U.S. Department of 
Education sought, at least implicitly, to redraw separation of power 
boundaries between the federal government’s executive and legislative 
branches.15 
While education federalism disputes raise both vertical and horizontal 
separation of power concerns, most scholars emphasize the former. As a 
consequence, the conventional understanding of the term “education 
federalism” has evolved quickly into code for, at bottom, a demand for an 
increased federal role in elementary and secondary education.16 Certainly, 
for those whose education federalism frame is informed by a normative 
preference for a greater federal role, recent scholarly accounts of educ-
ation federalism remain increasingly—and largely—negative. According 
to Professor Kristi Bowman, for example, and with a particular eye on the 
school ﬁnance context, “Education federalism is failing our children.”17 
Others similarly dismiss education federalism as having “hampered past 
efforts to ensure equal educational opportunity as the nation considers 
                                                                                                                           
 12. For evidence of the Supreme Court’s recognition of and respect for local control, 
see, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721, 752 (1974) (holding a federal court may 
not “impose a multidistrict, areawide remedy to a single-district de jure segregation 
problem absent any ﬁnding that the other included school districts” also fostered such 
segregation within the district in question); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973) (holding Texas’s public school ﬁnance system should be given 
deference under strict scrutiny review). But see, e.g., Denis P. Doyle & Chester E. Finn, Jr., 
American Schools and the Future of Local Control, 77 Pub. Int. 77, 77 (1984) 
(questioning the “legend” surrounding local control over K–12 education policy). 
 13. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002). 
 14. Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015). 
 15. See infra section I.B. 
 16. See, e.g., Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 102); Bowman, supra 
note 7 (manuscript at 3); Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 1. 
 17. Bowman, supra note 7 (manuscript at 3). 
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adopting new efforts to achieve this vital national goal.”18 Finally, with 
speciﬁc reference to the recently enacted ESSA, Professor Derek Black 
warns that federal disengagement with K–12 education in favor of the 
states poses a fundamental threat to America’s goal of and promise for 
equal educational opportunity.19 
A. Vertical Separation of Powers 
Successive substantial federal legislative forays into the K–12 
education sector since 2000 reveal persistent unease with—and uncer-
tainty about—the federal government’s proper policy role in the K–12 
education setting. These federal legislative forays imply dramatically 
different views about vertical separation of power and, as a consequence, 
illustrate how education federalism boundaries have changed and how 
the velocity of change has increased over time. 
1. Pre-No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). — Professor Kimberly Jenkins 
Robinson notes, “Education federalism in the United States traditionally 
embraces state and local authority over education and a restricted federal 
role.”20 Moreover, judicial decisions have traditionally supported state 
and local primacy in the education realm.21 This deference to state and 
local control over schools was far from total, however, and began to 
erode over time. Incident to President Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” in 
1965, Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA).22 While ESEA reﬂected a bold extension of federal authority 
into the nation’s public elementary and secondary schools, the Act and 
other legislation also directed new federal funding to discrete subpools 
of disadvantaged students. For example, ESEA’s Title I focused federal 
resources on the educational needs of students from low-income 
families,23 section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act targeted federal funds for 
students with special needs,24 and Title IX helped ensure that students 
were not discriminated against by virtue of their gender.25 
                                                                                                                           
 18. Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 331. 
 19. See Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 133) (noting the shift of 
power toward states is cause for concern in light of the states’ track records on equal 
educational opportunity absent federal intervention). 
 20. Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 287. 
 21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 22. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965). 
 23. See, e.g., President Lyndon B. Johnson, Johnson’s Remarks on Signing the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (Apr. 11, 1965), http://www.lbjlibrary.org/ 
lyndon-baines-johnson/timeline/johnsons-remarks-on-signing-the-elementary-and-secondary- 
education-act [http://perma.cc/F3RX-EUDV] (“[ESEA] represents a major new commit-
ment of the federal government to quality and equality in the schooling that we offer our 
young people.” (emphasis added)). 
 24. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). 
 25. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
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It is one thing for federal programs to focus on discrete student 
subpools, but it is quite another for federal programs to engage with 
broader elementary and secondary education policy. And while early 
federal legislation began targeting speciﬁc subpools of students, it wasn’t 
until 1994 and the passage of the Improving America’s Schools Act 
(IASA)26 that Congress widened its regulatory scope and posture and 
took aim at broader policy issues (for example, states’ standards and 
assessments) that implicated all elementary and secondary schools and 
students. Despite the federal government’s increasingly robust policy 
presence in K–12 schools, prior to 2000 and NCLB’s emergence, the 
thrust of the federal government’s involvement was generally targeted to 
speciﬁc policy objectives and discrete student subpools. It is worth 
noting, however, that a characterization of Congress’s policymaking role 
in K–12 education up to 2001 that emphasizes its limitations is not meant 
to diminish the federal government’s important and growing presence in 
the nation’s schools. For example, one critical facet of a multidecade 
and, to some extent, ongoing effort to desegregate and integrate public 
schools played out in the nation’s federal courts.27 
2. The No Child Left Behind Act. — Regardless of how one chooses to 
frame the federal government’s traditional role in K–12 education prior 
to NCLB, few quibble with the proposition that NCLB introduced a 
qualitatively new degree and breadth of federal engagement with 
education policy.28 Having previously required states to develop, 
articulate, and implement their own academic standards and assessments 
in 1994, fewer than ten years later, in 2001, Congress, in a bipartisan 
effort, set out to establish a federal statute that sought to close and, 
indeed, eliminate persistent academic achievement gaps among various 
subpools of students. The resulting legislation, NCLB, reﬂected perhaps 
the broadest, deepest, and most signiﬁcant federal foray into the 
elementary and secondary school domain.29 
NCLB’s legal and policy signiﬁcance ﬂows partly from its vast scope, 
which implicated every public K–12 school regardless of whether the 
school received Title I funding.30 In exchange for the promise of 
                                                                                                                           
 26. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994). 
 27. For one recent discussion of this point, see, e.g., Chinh Q. Le, Racially Integrated 
Education and the Role of the Federal Government, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 725, 730 (2010) 
(describing the powerful Brown v. Board of Education mandate in a discussion of the federal 
government’s role in school integration). See generally Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: 
The History of Brown v. Board Of Education and Black America’s Struggle For Equality 
(1977) (discussing the historical and legal context of Brown v. Board of Education). 
 28. See, e.g., Robinson, Disrupting, supra note 4, at 966. 
 29. See, e.g., Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 322–23. 
 30. NCLB involves every state because all receive some level of federal Title I 
funding. See Revised ESEA Title I LEA Allocations—FY 2016, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., http:// 
www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/titlei/fy16/index.html [http://perma.cc/Y63J-GMRG] 
(last visited Aug. 29, 2017) (presenting the Title I allocations for each state, plus the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, in the 2016 ﬁscal year). For a helpful summary of 
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additional federal ﬁnancial support, NCLB required states to meet a 
series of outcome-based student-achievement benchmarks.31 The engine 
that drove this exchange relied on fuel supplied by state-determined 
standard-and-assessment regimes.32 The ignition spark involved federally 
enforced accountability measures that pivoted on determinations of 
adequate yearly progress for student academic achievement33 measured 
by annual student testing.34 In so doing, however, Congress “substantially 
expanded and restructured the federal role in elementary and secondary 
education and . . . ultimately shaped a new educational federalism.”35 
In the service of the federal government’s effort to help improve 
student achievement and close nagging achievement gaps, NCLB reset 
the education federalism boundary in a manner substantially more 
favorable to federal authority. Mindful that federalism boundaries still 
existed and aware of the Supreme Court’s Dole test36 in particular, federal 
lawmakers self-consciously sought to avoid constitutional overreach in 
crafting NCLB. For example, rather than impose a single, uniform 
federal student assessment measure upon states, NCLB instead required 
the states themselves to develop such assessments37 and submit them for 
federal approval.38 One aspect that came closest to an imposition of a 
federal test, mandating state participation in the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) testing program,39 notably did not trigger 
any NCLB consequences for either states or districts. It is important to 
note that “[r]egardless of the reasons and motivations for Congress’s 
decisions, even NCLB’s harshest critics must applaud the strategic genius 
it embodies: an elegant use of political-economic leverage that generates 
policy coercion upon states that extends far beyond the reach of NCLB 
funds.”40 
                                                                                                                           
NCLB’s key parts, see James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind 
Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 932, 939–43 (2004) [hereinafter Ryan, Perverse Incentives] (arguing 
NCLB pursues laudable goals but generates important, unexpected consequences). 
 31. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2) (2012). For a helpful overview see generally Ryan, Perverse 
Incentives, supra note 30. 
 32. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(1). 
 33. Id. § 6311(b)(2). 
 34. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(G). 
 35. Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 323. However, some scholars view NCLB as 
merely “evolutionary” rather than “revolutionary.” See, e.g., Lorraine M. McDonnell, No 
Child Left Behind and the Federal Role in Education: Evolution or Revolution?, 80 
Peabody J. Educ. 19, 21 (2005) (suggesting NCLB did not revolutionize federal education 
policy, but rather was a new version of a type of policy that has historical roots). 
 36. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (outlining factors for a 
court to consider when determining the constitutionality of congressional action under 
the Spending Clause). 
 37. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3). 
 38. Id. § 6311(a)(1). 
 39. Id. § 6311(c)(2). 
 40. Heise, Political Economy, supra note 7, at 141. 
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NCLB deftly navigated the conditional spending authority requirem-
ents articulated by the Court’s then-interpretation of South Dakota v. 
Dole.41 By strategically leveraging limited federal authority and applying 
this authority to the standards and assessments that the states themselves 
developed and implemented through NCLB, the U.S. Department of 
Education accomplished indirectly what, in all likelihood, it could not 
have regulated directly.42 
Even a nimble (and, candidly, creative and entrepreneurial) exercise 
of federal authority cannot easily escape important federalism questions, 
however. NCLB raised—but did not squarely confront—a critical 
structural education federalism question: whether to decouple education 
policy authority and funding responsibility. More speciﬁcally, NCLB 
raised the question of whether, from a policy perspective, it is prudent to 
permit the federal government to inﬂuence elementary and secondary 
school policy beyond the extent of the federal government’s ﬁnancial 
contribution to state and local school district budgets. 
While some understood NCLB as a creative—if unusually aggressive—
use of federal authority, other scholars were not as generous in their 
assessments. For example, then-Professor James Ryan (now Dean of 
Harvard’s Graduate School of Education) zeroed in on the very factor 
that—while probably necessary for NCLB to claim sufficient consti-
tutional authority and likely necessary for political passage—nonetheless 
generated criticism. What Ryan found particularly troublesome about 
NCLB was that, although it assigned the federal government authority to 
sanction states for failing to meet academic standards and assessments, it 
assigned to states the right to deﬁne student assessment thresholds.43 
Ryan went on to note that resolving NCLB’s internal structural problem 
would have required the federal government to “get off the federalism 
fence.”44 In the end, some of NCLB’s structural problems—whether 
necessitated by federalism concerns or not—became quickly exposed as 
states, confronting the perceived or real threat of federal sanctions for 
failing to achieve adequate yearly progress, transformed academic standards 
                                                                                                                           
 41. See id. at 130–35 (arguing that NCLB stresses—though does not necessarily 
violate—the conditional spending requirements articulated in Dole). 
 42. In the interest of full disclosure, I was among those who argued that NCLB was 
not necessarily unconstitutional. My argument at that time assumed that NCLB did not 
impermissibly coerce state and local school districts because its conditional spending was 
better understood as a reimbursement rather than as a regulatory mandate. I concluded 
that while NCLB certainly pushed the envelope of education federalism boundaries 
through its strategic use of political-economic leverage, it did not constitute an 
unconstitutional act of statutory coercion despite evidence of the Act’s “coercion” plainly 
visible in the education policy domain. See id. at 156. 
 43. See Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 30, at 944; James E. Ryan, The Tenth 
Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal Boundaries of Education Governance, in 
Who’s in Charge Here?: The Tangled Web of School Governance and Policy 43, 53–54 
(Noel Epstein ed., 2004); see also Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 325. 
 44. Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 30, at 987. 
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and assessments setting authority into a “race to the bottom.”45 This 
policy outcome, a net reduction in state assessment thresholds, while 
perhaps inevitable, defeated NCLB’s broad policy objectives. 
3. Pushing NCLB to (or Beyond) Federalism’s Breaking Point. — Even 
many of NCLB’s critics did not fully anticipate the federal government’s 
next legal move. Under NCLB, states were statutorily obligated to make 
adequate yearly progress toward 100% student proﬁciency in English and 
math by 2014.46 However, such a statutory mandate was, as Professor 
Black describes, “unrealistic under any circumstances.”47 As NCLB’s obli-
gations “came due” for many states—something conceptually analogous 
to a “balloon mortgage”48 preparing to explode—what became obvious 
to all, particularly the states, was that without statutory relief, virtually all 
states were in jeopardy of losing eligibility for federal funding, which 
constitutes roughly ten percent of an average school district’s budget.49 
Indeed, by 2012, eighty percent of the nation’s public schools were 
predicted to fail to achieve adequate yearly progress under NCLB and, 
thus, were exposed to an array of consequences under federal law.50 
Absent congressional reauthorization, NCLB was set to automatically 
expire in 2007.51 Many states’ difficulties with meeting their own proﬁ-
ciency benchmarks made it abundantly clear to most observers that 
NCLB’s reauthorization would involve more than mere tinkering and, 
                                                                                                                           
 45. For a discussion and examples, see Heise, Political Economy, supra note 7, at 
143–47; Paul T. O’Neill, High Stakes Testing Law and Litigation, 2003 BYU Educ. & L.J. 
623, 657–59 (discussing suburban backlashes against standardized testing); Paul E. Peterson 
& Frederick M. Hess, Few States Set World-Class Standards, Educ. Next, Summer 2008, at 
70, 73 (“[A]t the 8th-grade level, standards are falling across the board—in both reading 
and math.”); see also Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 30, at 948 n.77; David J. Hoff, 
States Revise the Meaning of ‘Proficient,’ Educ. Wk. (Oct. 9, 2002), http://www.edweek.org/ 
ew/articles/2002/10/09/06tests.h22.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Diana 
Jean Schemo, Sidestepping of New School Standards Is Seen, N.Y. Times (Oct. 15, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/15/us/sidestepping-of-new-school-standards-is-seen.html 
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). 
 46. Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1111(b)(2)(F), 115 Stat. 1425, 1440 (2002); see also Black, 
Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 115); Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter 
Schools, and Lessons to Be Learned, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1723, 1752–56 (2012) [hereinafter 
Black, Lessons]. 
 47. Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 117); see also Black, Lessons, 
supra note 46, at 1752–56. 
 48. Under traditional “balloon” mortgages, a large percentage of the loan’s remaining 
principle is due at the end of the mortgage period. For a discussion of how this concept—
back-ending requirements—applies in the NCLB context, see, e.g., Andrew Spitser, School 
Reconstitution Under No Child Left Behind: Why School Officials Should Think Twice, 54 
UCLA L. Rev. 1339, 1379–83 (2007). 
 49. See Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 118 n.113) (citing Derek W. 
Black, Federalizing Education by Waiver?, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 607, 611 (2015) [hereinafter 
Black, Federalizing]). 
 50. See Black, Lessons, supra note 46, at 1753–57. 
 51. No Child Left Behind Act § 1002. 
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instead, require a substantial statutory overhaul.52 The ﬁnancial crisis and 
health care reform legislation certainly contributed to a political climate 
that resulted in inattention to and a delay of NCLB’s necessary reauth-
orization.53 
A political inability or unwillingness to reauthorize NCLB, combined 
with a growing number of states’ failure to achieve adequate yearly prog-
ress, set up an inevitable political collision.54 This collision approached, 
accelerated by a swelling political backlash against NCLB.55 Perhaps 
sensing a policy opening or frustrated with Congress’s neglect of NCLB’s 
needed reauthorization, the Obama Administration began to leverage 
NCLB ever further. Speciﬁcally, in 2011, Education Secretary Arne 
Duncan implemented a policy of granting states relief from NCLB in the 
form of administrative waivers.56 Even more troubling, however, was that 
Secretary Duncan imposed conditions on those states requesting federal 
regulatory waivers. For states, the political “price” of a waiver included an 
agreement to adopt speciﬁc favored federal education policies, notably 
the Common Core Standards.57 As even ardent supporters of a robust 
federal presence in K–12 education concede, Secretary Duncan’s waiver 
actions lacked “any speciﬁc legislative authority.”58 As a consequence of 
his actions, and untethered from federal law, Secretary Duncan suc-
ceeded in federalizing “core aspects of education in just a few short 
months.”59 
By using the administrative waiver process as “a substitute for the 
legislative process,” the Obama Administration functionally worked around 
traditional lawmaking institutions, notably Congress, and, in so doing, 
redrew separation of power boundaries and encroached upon states’ 
sovereignty.60 Anxious to avoid the stigma of having schools labeled by 
                                                                                                                           
 52. See Black, Lessons, supra note 46, at 1756 (noting NCLB set unrealistic perfor-
mance expectations that were unlikely to be met by states). 
 53. See Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 120). 
 54. Id. (noting during the 2011–2012 school year approximately “80 percent of the 
nation’s schools would fail to meet [NCLB’s] requirements”). 
 55. See, e.g., Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding 
the Notion of Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & Educ. 1, 29 (2010) 
(discussing reasons for backlash against NCLB, which included the lack of national 
curriculum and limited district control over academic objectives because of NCLB’s focus 
on test-driven behaviors). 
 56. See 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2012) (waiving statutory and regulatory requirements); 
see also id. § 6316 (outlining the school improvement process and the onerous corrective 
actions imposed on schools that fail to meet achievement targets). 
 57. Black, Federalizing, supra note 49, at 611; see also Judson N. Kempson, 
Comment, Star-Crossed Lovers: The Department of Education and the Common Core, 67 
Admin. L. Rev. 595, 607–18 (2015). 
 58. Black, Federalizing, supra note 49, at 613. 
 59. Id. at 611. 
 60. Id. at 648. 
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NCLB as “failing,” states had much at stake ﬁnancially and politically.61 
As such, these states were unusually vulnerable to the federal govern-
ment’s use of political leverage. Not surprisingly, states quickly agreed to 
the Secretary’s policy terms and conditions that attached to the 
regulatory waivers. By October 2013, the Department of Education had 
approved waiver applications for forty-three of the forty-ﬁve requesting 
states and the District of Columbia.62 Ironically, whatever short-term gains 
the states may have realized, the costs were not inconsequential. 
Speciﬁcally, the states’ agreement to implement the federal government’s 
preferred Common Core Standards emerged as a vibrant political issue 
that then-candidate Donald Trump exploited to his political beneﬁt.63 
While reasonable minds can and do differ over the efficacy of the 
Obama Administration’s particular use of regulatory waivers in the NCLB 
context, the tactic clearly raises important questions about basic 
federalism structure, including judicially enforced lines articulated in 
conditional spending decisions.64 While some scholars approve of the 
imposition of policy conditions in exchange for federal regulatory 
waivers for an array of policy silos,65 such practices typically survive 
constitutional scrutiny only when carefully crafted supporting legislative 
authority exists.66 According to Professor Black, however, Secretary 
Duncan “lacked that authority.”67 As such, the legislative workarounds 
pursued by Secretary Duncan in the education context fundamentally 
differed from analogous legislative workarounds in other policy domains. 
And this fundamental difference underscores the federalism concerns 
raised by the federal regulatory waivers from NCLB. Consequently, the 
federalization of education policy in the Obama Administration, however 
“momentous,” remained “legally unfounded.”68 More speciﬁcally, in 
addition to separation of power and federalism concerns, Secretary 
Duncan’s use of conditional waiver authority in this manner also may 
                                                                                                                           
 61. See Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 30, at 955–57 (noting NCLB “imposes 
swifter and harsher sanctions than most state systems”). 
 62. Morgan S. Polikoff et al., Am. Enter. Inst., Grading the No Child Left Behind 
Waivers 4 (2014), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/-education-outlook-
214_140305366436.pdf [http://perma.cc/BHE6-94EG]. See generally David J. Barron & 
Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 265, 325–27 (2013) 
(discussing Congress’s decision to grant the Department of Education the power to waive 
NCLB requirements). 
 63. While a candidate, President Trump repeatedly attacked Common Core and 
vowed to eliminate it if elected. See, e.g., Lisa Hagen, Trump Education Pick to Face 
Warren, Sanders, Hill (Jan. 16, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/ 
314292-trump-education-pick-to-face-warren-sanders [http://perma.cc/8DDP-XPCN]. 
 64. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (“What 
Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in that new 
program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Barron & Rakoff, supra note 62, at 334–35. 
 66. See id. at 312–18. 
 67. Black, Federalizing, supra note 49, at 611. 
 68. Id. 
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have violated the Spending Clause by, in essence, “chang[ing] the rules 
of the game in unexpected ways.”69 
4. The Every Student Succeeds Act. — Once Congress refocused its 
attention to K–12 education legislation, it elected to replace rather than 
reauthorize NCLB. Years of legislative inattention, combined with an 
unusually aggressive use of waiver authority, fueled ESSA’s enactment.70 
While much about ESSA and its full effects has not yet emerged, the 
implications for educational federalism boundaries are already palpable. 
According to one of ESSA’s key sponsors, Tennessee Republican Senator 
Lamar Alexander, ESSA represents a “signiﬁcant devolution of power” 
over K–12 schooling from the federal government to the states.71 
One critical way that ESSA departs from NCLB and enhances states’ 
power is by permitting them to develop, test, and measure academic 
metrics and standards. Aside from a requirement for standards to be 
“challenging” (notably left undeﬁned), ESSA now delegates to the states 
the task of developing academic standards. And in direct response to the 
Obama Administration’s use of conditional waivers, ESSA expressly per-
mits those states that previously adopted Common Core standards—
whether in exchange for regulatory relief or not—to withdraw and 
replace those academic standards.72 
More dramatic differences between NCLB and ESSA exist in the 
accountability domain. Actual consequences for failure to achieve ade-
quate annual testing results typically reside at the structural core of any 
accountability regime. To this end, one of NCLB’s pillars was that it held 
states and districts accountable for failures to achieve adequate yearly 
progress,73 and the consequences became increasingly severe for persis-
tent failures.74 Indeed, in many ways, the political pressure from a grow-
ing number of states and districts worried about their exposure under 
NCLB helps explain the states’ appetite for the Obama Administration’s 
unusually aggressive use of regulatory waivers. 
In comparison to NCLB, ESSA affords states far greater latitude in 
annual test results’ deployment. Under ESSA states are now free to dilute 
                                                                                                                           
 69. Id. at 615. 
 70. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing states’ heavy reliance on 
the regulatory waivers). 
 71. Alyson Klein, ESSA Architect Q&A: Sen. Lamar Alexander, R-Tenn., Educ. Wk.: 
Politics K–12 (June 13, 2016), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2016/ 
06/essa_architect_q_a_sen_lamar_a.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). 
 72. Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 8544, 129 Stat. 1802, 2119 (2015); see also Jessica Bulman-
Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 Va. L. Rev. 953, 989–91 (2016) 
(ﬁnding that “[i]n substance, the ESSA renders ‘null and void’ the waivers granted in 
recent years by the Department of Education to states and consortia”). 
 73. See, e.g., Spitser, supra note 48, at 1364–66 (describing the adverse consequences 
triggered by NCLB). 
 74. Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1116(b)(5), 115 Stat. 1425, 1482–83 (2002); see also Heise, 
Political Economy, supra note 7, at 135. 
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yearly testing results’ weight when it comes to annual school, district, and 
teacher performance.75 That is, ESSA largely relieves states and districts 
from the federal consequences that ﬂow from inadequate yearly student 
academic progress. In its place, ESSA imposes potential federal sanctions 
and requires states to intervene in only a discrete, small subset of schools: 
those in the bottom ﬁve percent of a state and those high schools with 
graduation rates below sixty-seven percent.76 Nesting standards-setting 
and accountability mechanisms in federal authority under NCLB was 
among NCLB’s hallmarks. ESSA, in contrast, affords states greater 
autonomy, both in terms of control over substantive standards setting and 
the consequences for states that fail to achieve their own self-deﬁned 
achievement goals. 
Finally, in a largely symbolic—though nonetheless notable—gesture, 
ESSA expressly limits the ability of the U.S. Secretary of Education to 
reject or impose conditions upon state-initiated remediation plans.77 Recall 
that during Duncan’s tenure as Education Secretary, the Department of 
Education engaged in what even his supporters acknowledge was an 
aggressive use of conditional waiver granting that, at once, relieved most 
states from unwelcome adverse consequences for failing to achieve ade-
quate yearly progress under NCLB and induced states to implement a 
federal preference for Common Core standards.78 Rather than permit 
similar statutory “end-runs” by future Education Secretaries, ESSA expressly 
eliminated the waiver activity that took place earlier in the Obama 
Administration.79 
Despite ample evidence illustrating how ESSA increases state authority 
and autonomy, it is important to note the parts of ESSA that preserve 
and, indeed, increase certain federal roles. For example, ESSA focuses 
federal attention on the bottom ﬁve percent of schools within each state 
as well as those high schools struggling with graduation rate problems.80 
Again, from a federalism perspective the juxtaposition of NCLB and 
ESSA’s scope could not be starker—the former functionally implicated 
every K–12 school while the latter restricts federal obligations to only ﬁve 
percent of a state’s schools. ESSA’s narrowed statutory focus is important 
for policy and political reasons. On the policy level, a focus on the lowest-
performing schools may generate the necessary attention to those schools 
                                                                                                                           
 75. Every Student Succeeds Act § 1005. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. § 8014. 
 78. See supra section I.A.3. 
 79. Every Student Succeeds Act § 4(c). In limiting federal oversight, ESSA also 
reprimands the Department of Education (which nonetheless supported the bill) with 
descriptions of the many forms of authority the Department may not exercise. See, e.g., id. 
§ 1005 (“The Secretary shall not have the authority to mandate, direct, control, coerce, or 
exercise any direction or supervision over any of the challenging State academic standards 
adopted or implemented by a State.”); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 72, at 989–90. 
 80. Every Student Succeeds Act § 1005. 
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most in need. On the political front, such a focus keeps the remaining 
ninety-five percent of schools within a state outside of the federal statute’s 
crosshairs. 
Moreover, while ESSA severely restricts the Secretary of Education’s 
authority, some vestiges of federal oversight endure. Although states are 
now charged with devising their own accountability goals, states must still 
submit these goals to the Department of Education.81 Finally, in one 
discrete context—preschool education—federal policy authority increased.82 
On balance, however, ESSA clearly reverses the previous educational 
federalism boundaries established by NCLB. While NCLB may have 
functionally “federalized” K–12 education policy, ESSA is noted princi-
pally for redirecting education policy from the federal government back 
to the states.83 According to one of the leading Senate sponsors of ESSA, 
Senator Alexander, a resetting of education federalism boundaries in this 
direction was entirely consistent with the legislative intent.84 
What to make of this education federalism boundary shift remains 
contested. Some applaud ESSA’s reallocation of federal–state power in 
the K–12 sector on purely structural and historic grounds.85 Others, while 
acknowledging states’ greater authority under ESSA, fear the secondary 
and tertiary consequences threatened by an increase in state autonomy 
and a corresponding decrease in federal control.86 According to its 
critics, who are not difficult to ﬁnd, ESSA “moves education in a 
direction that was unthinkable just a few short years ago: no deﬁnite 
equity provisions, no demands for speciﬁc student achievement, and no 
enforcement mechanism to prompt states to consistently pursue equity 
or achievement.”87 
Despite differing opinions on the implications of the migration from 
NCLB to ESSA for education federalism, many agree that the latter 
                                                                                                                           
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. § 921. 
 83. Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 103); see also Betheny Gross & 
Paul T. Hill, The State Role in K–12 Education: From Issuing Mandates to 
Experimentation, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 299, 299 (2016) (noting ESSA “intended to 
return policy authority back to legislatures, governors, and state education agencies”). 
 84. See supra text accompanying note 71. Notably, Senator Alexander served as 
Secretary of Education from 1991–1993 during the George H.W. Bush Administration. 
Alexander, Lamar, Biographical Directory of the U.S. Cong., http://bioguide.congress.gov/ 
scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=a000360 [http://perma.cc/XR22-VBLT] (last visited Aug. 28, 
2017). 
 85. See, e.g., Gross & Hill, supra note 83, at 322–24 (arguing that under ESSA states 
may accelerate progress toward more effective schools). 
 86. See, e.g., Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 103–06) (emphasizing 
the negative impacts of ESSA on low-income students and equal educational opportunity); 
Deena Dulgerian, The Impact of the Every Student Succeeds Act on Rural Schools, 24 
Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 111, 130–35 (2016) (describing ESSA’s adverse consequences 
on rural schools). 
 87. Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 103). 
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reﬂects a more “state-centric law.”88 And if enhancing state autonomy in 
the K–12 policy sphere by diluting federal authority were not enough, 
ESSA also voids all waivers previously granted by the Department of 
Education.89 Indeed, some commentators note that ESSA will, eventually, 
“supersede the many waivers offered to some forty-two states to the NCLB 
requirements which the Obama administration had used to buy political 
time while moving education reform forward.”90 
B. Horizontal Separation of Powers—U.S. Department of Education “Dear 
Colleague” Letters 
While much of the public attention to Education Secretary Betsy 
DeVos’s nomination dwelled on her prior public endorsements of and 
support for an array of school choice measures, including charter schools 
and vouchers,91 comparatively less appreciated is the Trump Administration’s 
posture on horizontal separation of power issues raised by two “Dear 
Colleague” letters issued by the Education Department during the Obama 
Administration concerning Title IX. 
1. School Bathrooms. — In 2016, North Carolina enacted a law, 
known as House Bill 2, that, among other things, deﬁned student gender 
as a student’s sex assigned at birth (or “biological” sex) for purposes of 
access to public school bathrooms.92 The Justice Department under 
President Obama informed the North Carolina Governor that the North 
Carolina law violated federal antidiscrimination laws.93 Then-Governor 
                                                                                                                           
 88. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 72, at 991 (arguing that ESSA “diminishes 
federal involvement in education” and, as compared to NCLB, is a more “state-centric” 
law); see also supra note 71 and accompanying text (quoting Senator Alexander 
describing ESSA as a “signiﬁcant devolution of power” from the federal government to the 
states). 
 89. Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802, 1806 (2015). For a discussion of the way in 
which ESSA addresses the Department of Education’s waiver activity under the Obama 
Administration, see Bulman-Pozen, supra note 72, at 990 n.151. 
 90. Joel Rogers, Foreword: Federalism Bound, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 281, 291 
(2016). 
 91. See, e.g., Editorial, Big Worries About Betsy DeVos, N.Y. Times (Jan. 10, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/opinion/big-worries-about-betsy-devos.html (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (“She has poured money into charter schools advocacy, 
winning legislative changes that have reduced oversight and accountability. About 80 
percent of the charter schools in Michigan are operated by for-proﬁt companies, far 
higher than anywhere else.”); see also Michael A. Naclerio, Note, Accountability Through 
Procedure? Rethinking Charter School Accountability and Special Education Rights, 117 
Colum. L. Rev. 1153, 1159–61 (2017) (describing ways in which charter schools are 
functionally and legally distinct from traditional school districts). 
 92. An Act to Provide for Single-Sex Multiple Occupancy Bathroom and Changing 
Facilities in Schools and Public Agencies and to Create Statewide Consistency in 
Regulation of Employment and Public Accommodations, Sess. L. No. 2016-3, § 1.2, 2016 
N.C. Sess. Laws 12, 12–13. 
 93. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1–2, McCrory v. United States, No. 
5:16-cv-00238-BO (E.D.N.C. ﬁled May 9, 2016) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) 
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Pat McCrory quickly ﬁled a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief vindicating 
his state’s law.94 On that same day, the Justice Department ﬁled its own 
lawsuit asking a federal court to declare that the North Carolina law vio-
lated federal law.95 
While North Carolina subsequently repealed House Bill 2, the 
debate it ignited persists.96 On May 13, 2016, the Obama Administration’s 
Office for Civil Rights in the Department of Education (OCR) and Civil 
Rights Division of the Department of Justice released a “Dear Colleague” 
letter to all recipient institutions bound by Title IX designed to prohibit 
discrimination based on a student’s gender identity.97 Speciﬁcally, the 
letter asserts that for Title IX purposes the federal government “treat[s] 
a student’s gender identity as the student’s sex.”98 
OCR’s “Dear Colleague” letter expressly purported to provide 
“signiﬁcant guidance” rather than expand Title IX’s legal obligations on 
schools.99 While the letter implicated an array of school activities and 
programs,100 in the public’s mind the issue became quickly joined with 
growing disputes over “restroom access” and the implications for trans-
gender students.101 Despite the continued public and growing legal atten-
                                                                                                                           
(“The United States, through its Department of Justice . . . threatened legal action against 
Governor McCrory, Secretary Perry, and others, because plaintiffs intend to follow North 
Carolina law requiring public agencies to generally limit use of multiple occupancy 
bathroom and changing facilities to persons of the same biological sex.”). 
 94. Id. at 8–9. This lawsuit, ﬁled by Governor McCrory, was subsequently voluntarily 
dismissed without prejudice in light of the Justice Department’s own lawsuit. Plaintiff’s 
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice at 3, McCrory, No. 5:16-cv-00238-BO 
(E.D.N.C. ﬁled Sept. 16, 2016) (on ﬁle with Columbia Law Review). 
 95. United States v. North Carolina, No. 1:16CV425, 2016 WL 4005839, at *1 
(M.D.N.C. July 25, 2016). 
 96. See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Bathroom Law Repeal Leaves Few Pleased in North 
Carolina, N.Y. Times (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/us/north-
carolina-senate-acts-to-repeal-restrictive-bathroom-law.html?_r=0 (on ﬁle with the Columbia 
Law Review) (describing various interest group reactions to the repeal of House Bill 2). 
 97. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter: Transgender 
Students 2 (May 13, 2016) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter: Transgender Students], 
http://www.ed.gov/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
U2FU-PV8Y]. 
 98. Id. at 2. 
 99. Id. at 1. 
 100. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.4, 106.31(a) (2016) (requiring that all recipients of federal 
funding assure, among other things, that they have not denied any student participation 
in any academic, extracurricular, or other educational program or activity on the basis of 
sex). Insofar as Title IX addresses an array of “educational programs and activities,” OCR’s 
“guidance” extended beyond school bathrooms. Dear Colleague Letter: Transgender 
Students, supra note 97, at 1. 
 101. See Dear Colleague Letter: Transgender Students, supra note 97, at 3 (“A school 
may not require transgender students to use [restrooms and locker rooms] inconsistent 
with their gender identity or to use individual-user [restrooms and locker rooms] when 
other students are not required to do so.”); Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Transgender 
Bathroom Debate and the Looming Title IX Crisis, New Yorker (May 24, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/public-bathroom-regulations-could-create-a-
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tion to the OCR “Dear Colleague” letter issued by the Obama 
Administration, the Trump Administration quickly withdrew it.102 
The current Administration’s withdrawal of the OCR “Dear Colleague” 
letter informed ongoing litigation. In G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester 
County School Board, a transgender student sought access to the school 
bathroom that corresponded with the student’s gender identity rather 
than the student’s at-birth sex assignment.103 The Gloucester County 
School Board initially granted the transgender student’s request, but 
after some community members expressed disapproval, the Board imple-
mented a policy that limited students to school bathrooms that 
correspond with their at-birth sex assignment.104 After the adoption of 
the new restroom policy, the student turned to litigation and sought relief 
under Title IX.105 The student’s request for a preliminary injunction was 
denied by a federal district court, which also concluded that the student 
failed to state a legal claim.106 
The student’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit, however, proved more 
successful. Reversing some evidentiary rulings by the trial court, the 
Fourth Circuit also concluded that the OCR’s “Dear Colleague” letter 
was entitled to some degree of legal deference—speciﬁcally, Auer 
deference107—as it evidences the Department of Education’s interpretation 
of Title IX.108 The Supreme Court initially stayed the matter. After 
agreeing to hear the appeal, the Supreme Court later decided to vacate 
and remand the Fourth Circuit’s decision to the appeals court in light of 
the current Administration’s withdrawal of the “Dear Colleague” letter, 
which ﬁgured so prominently in the Fourth Circuit’s original decision.109 
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 103. 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 739–41 (E.D. Va. 2015), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 
822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.). 
 104. Id. at 740–41. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 744–53. 
 107. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding that an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations is due deference). 
 108. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 719–24. 
 109. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017) 
(mem.); see also Robert Barnes & Moriah Balingit, Supreme Court Takes up  
School Bathroom Rules for Transgender Students, Wash. Post (Oct. 28, 2016), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-takes-up-school-bathroom-rules- 
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2. Student Sexual Assault. — Earlier, in 2011, the OCR released 
another “Dear Colleague” letter, this one involving student sexual 
assault.110 Specifically, the Obama Administration’s Education Department 
construed sexual assault as sexual “harassment” for purposes of Title 
IX.111 As Harvard Law Professor Jeannie Suk Gersen describes in a New 
Yorker essay, the OCR letter went on to detail speciﬁcally how schools, 
colleges, and universities needed to adapt their student disciplinary 
policies and procedures with respect to incidences of alleged sexual 
assault, with particular reference to lowering burden of proof stan-
dards.112 A recipient institution that failed to comply with Title IX risked 
losing federal funding.113 
Unlike prior OCR policy guidance, including so-called “signiﬁcant” 
policy guidance,114 the 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter did not beneﬁt from 
formal administrative law notice-and-comment requirements.115 As it 
relates to OCR’s particular directive to colleges and universities to reduce 
the applicable standard of proof burden to the civil preponderance 
threshold in campus sexual assault hearings,116 the OCR sought to justify 
its position on the grounds that this was the standard used in Title VII 
hearings.117 What makes OCR’s position uncomfortable, however, is that 
OCR’s “Dear Colleague” letter did not also adopt Title VII’s protections 
for the accused.118 If that omission were not enough, in an ironic twist 
the OCR “Dear Colleague” letter also expressly recommended against 
some of the procedural safeguards included in Title VII.119 
                                                                                                                           
for-transgender-students/2016/10/28/0eece4ea-917f-11e6-a6a3-d50061aa9fae_story.html?utm_ 
term=.f1e742c46d6c [http://perma.cc/J865-WT63]. 
 110. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual 
Violence (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence], http:// 
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [http://perma.cc/GA6V-KR8P]. 
 111. Id. at 1–2. 
 112. Id. at 11 (“Thus, in order for a school’s grievance procedures to be consistent 
with Title IX standards, the school must use a preponderance of the evidence standard 
(i.e., it is more likely than not that sexual harassment or violence occurred).”); see also 
Gersen, supra note 101 (describing the April 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter and its 
ramiﬁcations). 
 113. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), (c) (2012). “Recipient institutions” bound by Title IX and 
exposed to its sanctions include virtually every accredited college and university in the 
United States as well as, by deﬁnition, all public elementary and secondary schools. Id. 
§ 1681(c). 
 114. See Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence, supra note 110, at 1 n.1. 
 115. See Tamara Rice Lave, A Critical Look at How Top College and Universities Are 
Adjudicating Sexual Assault, 71 U. Miami L. Rev. 377, 389 (2017) (describing how the 
2011 letter did not “post a formal notice requesting feedback” on proposed changes). 
 116. See Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence, supra note 110, at 11. 
 117. Id. at 10–11. 
 118. These protections include, but are not limited to, a right to demand a jury trial, 
cross-examine witnesses, and confront the complainant. For a discussion see Lave, supra 
note 115, at 390. 
 119. See id. 
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Notwithstanding the procedural and substantive concerns with 
OCR’s legal interpretation of Title IX, many schools, colleges, and 
universities quickly adopted campus-level policies and practices 
consistent with those articulated in the “Dear Colleague” letter.120 What 
has ensued, however, includes a string of notable and notably successful 
lawsuits against these very schools, colleges, and universities brought by 
students accused under the new OCR guidelines complaining of an array 
of due process violations.121 As legal and related ﬁnancial exposure 
continues to mount for many colleges and universities on this front,122 a 
number of higher education administrators, many of whom previously 
may have welcomed—indeed, encouraged—OCR’s “guidance,” are now 
quickly rethinking their position and beginning to push back against 
OCR’s “guidance.” For example, one harbinger is that while Harvard 
University adapted its university-wide student sexual assault code to 
conform with OCR “guidance,”123 Harvard Law School, alarmed by the 
dire due process implications for those accused and subjected to policies 
and procedures promoted by the OCR “Dear Colleague” letter, declined 
to follow the university’s lead and instead developed and now employs its 
own set of policies and procedures that differ in critical ways from the 
university-wide approach.124 
Indeed, similar to its earlier withdrawal of the “Dear Colleague” 
letter implicating school bathrooms, on September 7, 2017, in a widely 
anticipated speech, U.S. Education Secretary DeVos announced the 
Administration’s decision to “revisit” the legal rules governing what Title 
                                                                                                                           
 120. See id. at 391–98 (describing ﬁndings from a survey of top colleges and 
universities about the procedural protections given to students accused of sexual assault). 
 121. For a recent comprehensive treatment of this issue and the related litigation see 
generally KC Johnson & Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Campus Rape Frenzy: The Attack on Due 
Process at America’s Universities (2017). 
 122. For a brief summary of the growing—and successful—litigation against colleges 
and universities, see generally id. at 87–96. 
 123. See Harvard Univ., Sexual and Gender-Based Harassment Policy (2017), http:// 
titleix.harvard.edu/files/title-ix/files/harvard_sexual_harassment_policy.pdf?m=1461104544 
[http://perma.cc/HZ4S-XHFD] (updating the university’s policies and procedures, 
including its deﬁnition of sexual assault, to comply with OCR guidance). For a general 
summary, see, e.g., Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX Enforcement, 
128 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 103, 107 & n.9, 109 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2015/02/vol128_Halley_REVISED_2.17.pdf [http://perma.cc/9N3C-2557]. 
 124. See Harvard Law Sch., Interim Sexual Harassment Policy and Procedures, 
http://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2014/09/hls-titleix-interimpolicy1.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/7352-CMRU] (last visited Aug. 7, 2017) (adopting, for the 2014–2015 academic 
year, certain aspects of the university policies while changing other features). For 
emerging evidence that the Trump Administration is also now rethinking its position on 
the Student Sexual Assault “Dear Colleague” letter, see Erica L. Green & Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Campus Rape Policies Get a New Look as the Accused Get DeVos’s Ear, N.Y. 
Times (July 12, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/us/politics/campus-rape-
betsy-devos-title-iv-education-trump-candice-jackson.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law 
Review) (discussing the Department of Education’s readiness to reexamine Obama-era 
policies pertaining to students accused of sexual assault). 
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IX requires of schools, colleges, and universities when policing campus 
sexual assault.125 Secretary DeVos expressed alarm at too many instances 
of “kangaroo courts” on campuses that ill-served accusers and the 
accused.126 Notably, she committed to a review process that, consistent 
with Administrative Procedure Act requirements, will involve traditional 
notice-and-comment of proposed rules. Despite unsurprising criticism 
from many interest groups,127 opinion pieces appearing in the New York 
Times voiced clear support for Secretary DeVos’ announcement.128 While 
it is all but certain that the Obama Administration’s 2011 “Dear 
Colleague” letter will be rendered moot by forthcoming actions by the 
current Administration, it remains thus far unclear whether Secretary 
DeVos will seek to formally withdraw the 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter 
during the pendency of the Department’s review of Title IX. 
3. “Dear Colleague” Letters’ Implications for Horizontal Separation of 
Power. — Setting aside the merits of and controversies surrounding 
gender-identity and campus sexual-assault policies and procedures, 
admittedly important topics, a comparatively underappreciated issue 
raised by the OCR “Dear Colleague” letters involves horizontal sepa-
ration of powers, particularly as related to education federalism. Specif-
ically, the issue revealed an important conﬂict between Congress and the 
executive branch over education federalism. 
A Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
(HELP) hearing on June 26, 2014, illustrated this conﬂict and featured a 
particularly pointed and heated exchange between the Committee Chair, 
Senator Alexander, and Catherine Lhamon, an Assistant Secretary for 
Civil Rights at the Department of Education.129 The protracted inter-
action focused on technical questions involving OCR’s speciﬁc legal 
authority to enact its desired policy changes to Title IX through its 2011 
“Dear Colleague” letter. Senator Alexander worried aloud that by dressing 
the Department of Education’s demands as “significant guidance,” the 
Department was essentially trying to enact new “law” without adhering to 
the requirements imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act, notably 
the requirements for notice and public comment.130 According to Senator 
Alexander, 
What you’re doing [in the OCR]  is writing out detailed 
guidance for 22 million students on 7,200 campuses, and it’s 
                                                                                                                           
 125. See Stephanie Saul & Dana Goldstein, Betsy DeVos Says She Will Rewrite Rules 
on Campus Sex Assault, N.Y. Times (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
09/07/us/devos-campus-rape.html?_r=0 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (noting criticism from such groups as the National Women’s Law Center). 
 128. See Bret Stephens, Opinion, Betsy DeVos Ends a Campus Witch Hunt, N.Y. Times 
(Sept. 8, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/opinion/betsy-devos-title-iv.html?rref= 
collection%2Fcolumn%2Fbret-stephens (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). 
 129. Johnson & Taylor, supra note 121, at 191–94. 
 130. Id. 
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just—it could be your whim, your idea . . . . We [the U.S. 
Congress] make the law. You don’t make the law. Where does 
such a guidance authority come from?131 
Certainly contributing to Lhamon’s misfortune and discomfort was 
that Senator Alexander had previously served as the Secretary of 
Education from 1991 to 1993 under President George H.W. Bush132 and 
as university president from 1988 to 1991 at the University of Tennessee133 
and beneﬁts from formal legal training.134 Within a year of Assistant 
Secretary Lhamon’s clash with Senator Alexander, OCR officials began to 
publicly retreat from their original assertions, as well as from the explicit 
text of the “Dear Colleague” letter itself, and ultimately conceded that 
OCR’s “Dear Colleague” letters are not, in fact, legally binding upon the 
recipient educational institutions despite previous public assertions to 
the contrary.135 Substance aside, the series of exchanges involving 
Senator Alexander and various OCR officials helpfully distills, isolates, 
and identiﬁes conﬂicts that can arise between the legislative and 
executive federal branches when it comes to control over federal law. 
Increasingly, these conﬂicts involve education federalism. 
II. SCHOOL CHOICE’S PERSISTENT GROWTH 
In early September 2016, then-candidate Trump announced that, if 
elected President, he would transform $20 billion of existing federal 
education funds into a block grant to states that could be deployed for 
the beneﬁt of private, charter, or public schools.136 President Trump’s 
political impulse is one of the more recent—and prominent—political 
reﬂections of a persistently growing parental demand for greater choice 
when it comes to K–12 education. Evidence of ever-increasing parental 
appetite for greater school choice is not hard to ﬁnd. 
                                                                                                                           
 131. Id. 
 132. In the interest of full disclosure, I served as then-U.S. Education Secretary Lamar 
Alexander’s Deputy Chief of Staff from 1991–1992. 
 133. About the Office of the President, U. Tenn., http://president.tennessee.edu/ 
about/ [http://perma.cc/ND3L-BVHW] (last visited Aug. 29, 2017); Alexander, Lamar, 
supra note 84. Senator Alexander is a graduate of Vanderbilt University (B.A., 1962) and 
NYU Law School (J.D., 1965). Id. 
 134. See generally Lamar Alexander, Lamar Alexander: U.S. Senator for Tenn., 
http://www.alexander.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/lamaralexander [http://perma.cc/ 
3X48-A24X] (last visited Aug. 7, 2017). 
 135. See Examining the Use of Agency Regulatory Guidance: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs & Fed. Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 18–20 (2015) (statement of Sen. Alexander). 
 136. Diane Ravitch, When Public Goes Private, as Trump Wants: What Happens?, N.Y. 
Rev. Books (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/12/08/when-public-
goes-private-as-trump-wants-what-happens/ [http://perma.cc/D48Z-J7BU] [hereinafter 
Ravitch, Private] (reviewing Samuel E. Abrams, Education and the Commercial Mindset 
(2016) and Mercedes K. Schneider, School Choice: The End of Public Education? 
(2016)). 
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Indeed, President Trump’s support for increased school choice 
reﬂects a continuation of a political trend that began in earnest long 
before President Trump took the oath of office. A gradual shift in the 
production and delivery of K–12 education services from a “sector-
centered” perspective to what Professor Nicole Garnett refers to as a 
“child-centered” perspective has accelerated over time.137 The array of 
factors propelling a net growth in school choice demands includes the 
“exponential growth” of charter schools, complemented by a more 
recent increase in the availability of publicly funded school voucher 
programs.138 Similarly, concurrent increases in homeschool participation 
as well as more traditional public schools of choice (for example, magnet 
schools) also contribute to net increases in parental demands for 
greater autonomy when it comes to school decisions concerning their 
children.139 
At the same time the supply of school options available to parents 
increased, one paradoxical consequence of the recently discarded NCLB 
also helped fuel parents’ growing appetite for greater school choice. 
Speciﬁcally, one consequence of NCLB’s testing and reporting require-
ments was that they laid bare persistent academic struggles in numerous 
public schools and districts, including some comparatively affluent sub-
urban districts that, until NCLB, were presumed to be performing at a 
higher level.140 The increased availability of systematic information, 
however modest, about schools’ academic performance propelled more 
parents to increase their demands for greater school choices for their 
children. 
A. Evidence of Increased School Choice 
Given the plethora of school choice options—options that exist 
within the public school sphere as well as options between the public and 
non-public school markets141—one important, though broad, barometer 
                                                                                                                           
 137. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Sector Agnosticism and the Coming Transformation of 
Education Law, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2017). 
 138. Id.; see also Michael J. Petrilli, School Reform Moves to the Suburbs, N.Y. Times 
(July 11, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/11/opinion/school-reform-moves-to-
the-suburbs.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining the negative impact 
that certain exceptions and ﬂexible arrangements offered to states will have on suburban 
educational achievements). 
 139. See infra section II.A.1. 
 140. See Petrilli, supra note 138 (“[S]uburban schools are the most likely to post high 
average test scores that mask large gulfs between students of different races or classes . . . . 
The law made those achievement gaps transparent . . . .”). 
 141. To be sure, how to accurately deﬁne school “choice” remains under some 
contest. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and 
Secondary Education Enter the “Adapt or Die” Environment of a Competitive 
Marketplace, 29 J. Marshall L. Rev. 75, 96–99 (1995); Michael Heise, Equal Educational 
Opportunity and Constitutional Theory: Preliminary Thoughts on the Role of School 
Choice and the Autonomy Principle, 14 J.L. & Pol. 411, 413–14 (1998); Jason C. Seewer, 
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of interest in school choice involves changes over time in the percentage 
of students attending their government “assigned” public schools. Data 
from the U.S. Department of Education make clear that this percentage 
has declined from 80% in 1993 to 73% in 2007.142 To put this 7% decline 
into some context, the Department of Education reports that in 2013 just 
over ﬁfty million students attended public K–12 schools.143 A 7% decline 
in students attending their traditional government “assigned” public 
schools implies an approximate drop of 3.5 million students over a 
ﬁfteen-year period. 
Interestingly, the increased availability and flexibility of public funding 
helps fuel some of the attendance decline in students’ assigned public 
schools. To be sure, ﬂexible public funding enables some families to 
attend alternative public school options, such as charter and magnet 
schools, which are inter- and intra-district school choices. Other families, 
by contrast, use public funds to exercise their Pierce rights and seek out 
various non-public school options, including private and private religious 
schools, homeschooling, and virtual schools.144 Also notable is the vari-
ation of school choice options across the states. A 2013 report from the 
Council of Chief State School Officers notes that while all states provide 
at least some form of alternative to assigned public schools for some 
portion of students, none of the states provide all forms of school choice 
options to all students.145 While growth-trend curves differ across various 
school choice options, the cumulative effect of these options is evidence 
of slow and steady, if uneven, growth over time.146 
1. Charter and Magnet Schools. — Public charter schools’ importance 
in the school choice movement continues to increase over time. Between 
2000 and 2014, the raw number of charter schools more than quadrupled, 
from 1,525 to 6,465.147 Not surprisingly, an increase in the number of 
                                                                                                                           
Opening the Door: A Proposal for Increased Educational Choice in Detroit, 83 U. Detroit 
Mercy L. Rev. 411, 415–16 (2006). 
 142. Sarah Grady et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Trends in the Use of School 
Choice: 1993 to 2007, at 7 fig.1 (2010), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010004.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/2PYS-HEPC]. 
 143. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 203.10. 
Enrollment in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, by Level and Grade: Selected 
Years, Fall 1980 Through Fall 2026 (2016), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/ 
tables/dt15_203.10.asp [http://perma.cc/74WC-N8PQ]. 
 144. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (stating the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control”). 
 145. Council of Chief State Sch. Officers, School Choice in the States: A Policy 
Landscape (2013), http://www.ccsso.org/Documents/2013/Choice_by_State_2013.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/HP2M-5PB2]. 
 146. Julie F. Mead, How Legislation and Litigation Shape School Choice, in Exploring 
the School Choice Universe: Evidence and Recommendations 39, 41–44 (Gary Miron et al. 
eds., 2012) (summarizing the development of school choice initiatives since the 1950s). 
 147. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 216.90. Public 
Elementary and Secondary Charter Schools and Enrollment, By State: Selected Years, 
1884 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:1859 
 
charter schools helped fuel a similar increase in the number of students 
attending charter schools. Indeed, during these same years, 2000 to 2014, 
charter school enrollment increased by more than 740%.148 Finally, and 
perhaps most saliently, charter school enrollments grew as a percentage 
of total public school enrollment. In 2000, charter school enrollment 
accounted for less than 1% of total public school enrollment.149 By 2014, 
that percentage grew to 5.1%.150 When one adds public magnet schools 
into this mix, the drain on traditional “assigned” public school 
enrollment doubles. In 2014, of the 49.7 million students attending 
public schools, more than 5 million, or 10 percent of, students chose to 
attend charter or magnet public schools—that is, to attend a public 
school other than a student’s “assigned” public school.151 
Not surprisingly, charter schools vary—sometimes tremendously—
both within and across states.152 Although charter schools are, in a formal 
legal sense, public institutions, one trend within the public-charter-
school market includes the growing use of private management compa-
nies to operate public charter schools.153 Interestingly, the lurch toward 
privatization straddles traditional political labels.154 The cumulative effect 
of multiple administrations over time, both Republican and Democratic, 
is that “there are about seven thousand publicly-funded, privately-
managed charter schools, enrolling nearly three million students.”155 
Charter schools’ signiﬁcant growth should not deﬂect attention 
from another genre of intra-district school choice: magnet schools. 
Historically, magnet schools’ origins partly reﬂect public school districts’ 
(typically larger urban public districts) desire to increase desegregation 
and student achievement through schools that usually feature particular 
                                                                                                                           
1999–2000 Through 2013–2014 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/ 
tables/dt15_216.90.asp [http://perma.cc/7SZN-5E3S]. 
 148. Id. (indicating charter school enrollment increased from 339,678 to 2,519,065 
between 2000 and 2014). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 216.20. Number 
and Enrollment of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, by School Level, Type, and 
Charter and Magnet Status: Selected Years, 1990–91 Through 2013–14 (2015), 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_216.20.asp [http://perma.cc/343M-B39S]. 
 152. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Charter Schools and Public Education, 4 Stan. J. C.R. & 
C.L. 393, 394–95 (2008). 
 153. See generally Preston C. Green III et al., Having It Both Ways: How Charter 
Schools Try to Obtain Funding of Public Schools and the Autonomy of Private Schools, 63 
Emory L.J. 303 (2013) (highlighting the ways in which charter schools have used 
educational-management organizations and other private entities to obtain more funding 
from the public sector). 
 154. For one illustration, see, e.g., Clint Bolick, Voucher Wars: Waging the Legal Battle 
Over School Choice 15–43 (2003). 
 155. Ravitch, Private, supra note 136, at 58. 
2017] EDUCATION FEDERALISM 1885 
 
academic focus or curricular orientation.156 While magnet schools vary in 
terms of their focus and efficacy, they remain an attractive option for 
many families.157 Indeed, both the raw number of magnet schools as well 
as the number of students attending them more than doubled between 
2001 and 2014.158 Despite magnet schools’ variety, for purposes of this 
Essay, the two key characteristics that bind them are that they dislodge 
students away from geographically assigned public schools and provide 
parents and students with additional education options.159 
2. Private Schools and Voucher Programs. — Once-stable private 
religious and secular school enrollment (as measured by private school 
enrollment as a percentage of total school enrollment) has, since the 
2008 ﬁnancial crisis, displayed evidence of a slight decline. Between 1995 
and 2007, the private school enrollment percentage decreased from 
11.7% to 10.7%.160 Beginning in 2009, and through 2013, the percentage 
dipped to 9.8%.161 The percentage decline, however, should not obscure 
private school’s important market share of America’s school children. 
Despite any recent minor comparative market-share decline, the total 
number of students participating in private school choice programs “has 
more than tripled in the last decade to 350,000 students in 2014–
2015.”162 Among private school selections in 2013, families overwhelm-
                                                                                                                           
 156. See, e.g., Ellen Goldring & Claire Smrekar, Magnet Schools and the Pursuit of 
Racial Balance, 33 Educ. & Urb. Soc’y 17, 21 (2000) (discussing a study that found “whole-
school magnet programs (in which all students must choose the school) were the most 
successful in meeting desegregation goals when compared with programs in schools or 
mixed models of magnets and attendance zone magnets”); Kimberly C. West, A 
Desegregation Tool That Backﬁred: Magnet Schools and Classroom Segregation, 103 Yale 
L.J. 2567, 2568 (1994) (arguing the failure to consider classroom racial composition, and 
instead the reliance on school-wide racial composition, is a cause of the inefficacy of 
desegregation efforts in magnet schools); see also Janet R. Price & Jane R. Stern, Magnet 
Schools as a Strategy for Integration and School Reform, 5 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 291, 292 
(1987) (“The key characteristics of a magnet school are: (1) a distinctive school 
curriculum organized around a special theme or method of instruction; (2) voluntary 
enrollment elected by students and their parents; and (3) students drawn from many 
attendance zones.”). 
 157. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 216.20. Number 
and Enrollment of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, by School Level, Type, and 
Charter and Magnet Status: Selected Years, 1990–91 Through 2013–14 (2015), 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_216.20.asp [http://perma.cc/343M-B39S]. 
 158. Id. 
 159. For a brief overview see, e.g., Ryan & Heise, supra note 9, at 2064–65. 
 160. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 205.10. Private 
Elementary and Secondary School Enrollment and Private Enrollment as a Percentage of 
Total Enrollment in Public and Private Schools, by Region and Grade Level: Selected 
Years, Fall 1995 Through Fall 2013 (2016), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/ 
d15/tables/dt15_205.10.asp [http://perma.cc/A2FS-MQWT]. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Garnett, supra note 137, at 27. 
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ingly chose religious-affiliated schools over sectarian schools (68.1% 
versus 31.9%, respectively).163 
Voucher programs, both publicly and privately funded, seek, in part, 
to reduce barriers to the private school market for families.164 Early 
voucher programs tended to focus on either students from low-income 
households or students assigned to struggling public schools or both. By 
navigating critical open constitutional questions at that time,165 some 
early privately funded voucher programs operated as de facto pilot 
programs and, in addition to serving students and their families, set out 
to generate data and political support and increase the constituency for 
broader, more comprehensive publicly funded voucher programs.166 
Contributing much to the recent growth in publicly funded voucher 
programs is a shift in voucher programs’ initial focus on students from 
low-income households and those assigned to struggling public schools 
to a broader slice of middle-class students. While political realities 
typically prompted publicly and privately funded voucher programs to 
focus on those students most in need of additional school choices, as the 
politics surrounding school choice has evolved so too has voucher 
programs’ focus. Now, ironically, successful political support for voucher 
programs typically requires that the programs include middle-class families 
as well.167 
The often-uneasy relations between the private-school-voucher and 
charter-school movements also continue to inject political complexities 
into the school choice debate. While early privately funded voucher 
programs sought to stimulate the development of publicly funded 
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support for publicly funded vouchers included the District of Columbia’s Opportunity 
Scholarship Program, incident to the D.C. School Choice Incentive Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 126 (2004). The Opportunity Scholarship Program was 
reauthorized in 2011 as the Scholarships for Opportunity and Results Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
10, 125 Stat. 199 (2011). For purposes of this discussion, I construe “private school 
voucher programs” quite broadly to include an array of technically distinct though 
analytically similar programs (for example, vouchers, tuition tax credits, and education-
savings accounts). 
 165. Speciﬁcally, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Zellman. 
 166. See generally Terry M. Moe, Private Vouchers, in Private Vouchers supra note 
164, at 1, 7–9 (stating the “resort to privately funded vouchers is essentially an adaptation 
to political reality”). 
 167. See Garnett, supra note 137, at 26–27 (noting a recent surge in voucher or choice 
programs that have far broader scope than earlier programs). 
2017] EDUCATION FEDERALISM 1887 
 
voucher programs, one consequence was an acceleration of public 
charter schools’ popularity.168 As the specter of increased school choice 
grew, so too did political resistance to it.169 And this political resistance 
uncovered unexpected alliances between, for example, teacher unions, 
reacting to the threat posed by increased private school enrollments, and 
traditionally “suburban Republicans,” who are, in general, content with 
their public schools and threatened by the prospect of increasing access 
to them for lower-income urban students.170 As Professor Garnett notes, 
however, it remains possible that, in the end, the surge in charter schools 
and their popularity will bleed over into increased political support for 
school-voucher programs.171 
3.  Homeschooling and Online Education. — While presently the least 
signiﬁcant in terms of the raw number of students served, homeschool-
ing represents another and increasingly important threat to public-
school market share. In the homeschool sector, it is difficult to 
overestimate the inﬂuence of technological advances and the growing 
supply of and access to high quality education content, particularly the 
development of “turn-key” online education content.172 The interaction 
of these two factors has made homeschooling an increasingly plausible 
option for a far greater percentage of American families, both in terms of 
cost and execution. Given technological advances as well as dramatic 
increases in online content availability, it is not surprising that the 
Department of Education reports that from 2003 to 2012 the percentage 
of homeschooled K–12 students in the United States increased from 
2.2% to 3.4%, and the raw number of homeschooled children increased 
by almost 62%.173 
                                                                                                                           
 168. See Michael Heise, Law and Policy Entrepreneurs: Empirical Evidence on the 
Expansion of School Choice Policy, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1917, 1931 (2012) (noting it “is 
ironic from a policy perspective . . . that many school voucher supporters . . . made clear 
their desire for such programs to stimulate broader, comprehensive publicly-funded 
voucher programs”). 
 169. See generally Ryan & Heise, supra note 9 (noting the signiﬁcance of historical 
suburban resistance to school desegregation and school-ﬁnance reform). 
 170. See Garnett, supra note 137, at 25 (noting suburban Republicans are generally 
“happy with their public schools and unhappy about the prospect of poor urban students 
enrolling in them”); Ryan & Heise, supra note 9, at 2045, 2080 (“Suburban parents are 
generally satisﬁed with the public schools their children attend, and they want to protect 
both the physical and the ﬁnancial sanctity of these schools.”). 
 171. Garnett, supra note 137, at 26–27. 
 172. Indeed, even the U.S. Department of State helps facilitate homeschooling and 
seeks to exploit the growing array and the use of online content resources for the beneﬁt 
of Foreign Service families stationed outside of the United States. Cf. Homeschooling and 
Online Education, U.S. Dep’t of State, http://www.state.gov/m/dghr/ﬂo/c21941.htm 
[http://perma.cc/7CVF-CEDQ] (last visited Aug. 7, 2017) (outlining the Department of 
State’s homeschooling programs for Foreign Service families). 
 173. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 206.10. Number 
and Percentage of Homeschooled Students Ages 5 Through 17 with a Grade Equivalent of 
Kindergarten Through 12th Grade, by Selected Child, Parent, and Household 
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In addition to homeschooling growth trends, another notable wrinkle 
in the homeschool context is the evolving composition of households 
engaged in homeschooling and its deeper penetration into American 
society. Between 2003 and 2012, the percentage of homeschooling parents 
possessing a graduate or professional degree increased and the percentage 
of parents with no more than a high school diploma decreased.174 
Similarly, the median household income of homeschooled children has 
increased.175 The broadening of the pool of families engaged in home-
schooling has led some to characterize homeschools as “mainstream.”176 
B.  Education Spending: The 2007–2008 Financial Crisis and Its Implications 
for School Choice 
As overall federal education spending includes far more support for 
an array of school choice options, trends in federal ﬁnancial support for 
K–12 schools warrant careful attention for at least two reasons. First, 
while the school-ﬁnance context is one noted for sustained and pro-
tracted litigation, principally in state courts,177 the dynamic blend of 
education-funding sources is important for its potential federalism impli-
cations. To the extent that the federal government contributes a greater 
relative and absolute amount of education funding, a correlative increase 
in federal policy preferences would plausibly—and logically—follow. A 
second, and more subtle, reason involves the interaction among the 
various sources of public ﬁnancial support for education and the 2007–
2008 ﬁnancial crisis. This interaction may have contributed to increased 
parental demands for school choice, which, as previously discussed, 
plausibly reﬂects and implicates a shift in education decisionmaking 
authority from governments to families and students. 
1. Education Spending. — As Table 1 illustrates, after approximately 
1980, the distribution of federal, state, and local revenue sources for 
public elementary and secondary schools largely stabilized. A slight 
disruption, primarily owing to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008, emerged 
in the 2009–2010 school year. 
                                                                                                                           
Characteristics: 2003, 2007, and 2012 (2014), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/ 
tables/dt15_206.10.asp [http://perma.cc/37XE-LWSQ]. To be sure, however, the changes 
in these two trends over time are small and fall within the reported standard errors. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Jennifer Karinen, Note, Finding a Free Speech Right to Homeschool: An 
Emersonian Approach, 105 Geo. L.J. 191, 194–95 (2016) (noting that homeschooling has 
become “much more visible and accepted”). 
 177. See, e.g., John Dinan, School Finance Litigation: The Third Wave Recedes, in 
From Schoolhouse to Courthouse: The Judiciary’s Role in American Education 96, 96 
(Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2010) (discussing state court litigation over 
school ﬁnance). 
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TABLE 1: SOURCE OF REVENUE (PERCENTAGE), 1920–2013178 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the distribution of revenue among federal, state, and local 
sources conveys relative stability (post-1980), what Table 1 does not 
convey is the dynamic, real overall growth in per-pupil spending in 
America’s public elementary and secondary schools over these same 
years. Table 2 illustrates that, despite a recent downturn beginning in the 
2009–2010 school year, for almost the past century public school per-
pupil spending in the United States in real dollars displays a marked, 
steady increase over time. Interestingly, the combination of Tables 1 and 
2 implies that one source of the per-pupil spending drop in 2010 can be 
attributed to an absolute and comparative reduction in state education 
spending triggered by the ﬁnancial crisis. 
As Table 2 illustrates, there has been a nearly unbroken trend of 
increased per-pupil spending since 1920, excepting school years 
following 2009. The timing of this important break and the financial crisis 
cannot, obviously, be ascribed to mere coincidence. Given the broad and 
deep ﬁnancial devastation of the crisis, its deleterious implications for 
public and private budgets are similarly unsurprising. 
                                                                                                                           
 178.  Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 235.10. Revenues 
for Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, by Source of Funds: Selected Years, 1919–20 
Through 2012–13 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_235.10.asp 
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TABLE 2: TOTAL ANNUAL PER-PUPIL EXPENDITURE (IN CONSTANT 2014–
2015 DOLLARS), 1920–2013179 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Consequences for School Choice. — Lurking beneath the obvious 
consequences of the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis are less obvious and more 
subtle effects. As the per-pupil spending trend data in Table 2 illustrates, 
the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis clearly impacted education spending. As 
the data in Table 2 are aggregated across all districts by year, what is not 
illustrated is important across-district variation. Variations aside, Professor 
Black describes the financial consequences of the “Great Recession” to 
public school districts in blunt, dramatic terms.180 Setting aside the 
primary fallouts—including often dramatic reductions in raw cash ﬂow to 
many school districts—scholars have also noted additional secondary and 
tertiary consequences, albeit subtle ones, that may contribute to a further 
                                                                                                                           
 179.  Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t Educ., Digest of Education Statistics: 
Table 236.55. Total and Current Expenditures per Pupil in Public Elementary and 
Secondary Schools: Selected Years, 1919–20 Through 2012–13 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/ 
programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_236.55.asp [http://perma.cc/US7D-9NZ6]. 
 180. See Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher 
Shortages, and the Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 Wash. U. L. Rev. 423, 
424 (2016) (describing the impact as a “crisis” and noting that “[s]ome states experienced 
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devolution of education decisionmaking authority from governments to 
families and students.181 
Along with its impact on public education funding, the 2007–2008 
ﬁnancial crisis ﬁnancially devastated many households.182 Given the 
ﬁnancial crisis’s magnitude, the collateral damage inevitably included 
some children, speciﬁcally moving some children from private schools 
back to public schools. Thus, students who previously attended private 
schools now found themselves in public schools owing to familial 
ﬁnancial exigency. Some of these students and their families undoubt-
edly brought their preferences for greater school choice with them and 
began to push for greater public and publicly funded school choice. 
While parental demands for greater control over schooling options for 
their children predated the ﬁnancial crisis, an inﬂux of students from 
families predisposed toward greater school choice, as demonstrated by 
their preference for private school, into public schools will likely steepen 
the overall demand curve for greater parental autonomy. 
C. Demand for Public School: A Comparatively Smaller Slice of a Shrinking Pie 
An increasing demand for non-public school alternatives has over 
time eroded public schools’ market share of students. At the same time, 
demographic data convey a relatively static supply of school-age children. 
While the raw number of school-aged—deﬁned as ﬁve- to seventeen-year-
old—resident Americans between 2000 and 2010 suggests minimal 
growth, specifically around 1%, assessing school-aged, resident Americans 
as a percentage of the total resident population demonstrates a 1.5% 
decline from 18.9% to 17.4% in the same period.183 If one goes back to 
the 1969–1970 school year, the drop climbs to around 8%, from 25.8% to 
17.4%.184 Thus, the interaction of a demonstrably increasing appetite for 
school choice and a static supply of school-age children more accurately 
captures the contours of the challenges now confronting public schools 
and their potential customers. 
                                                                                                                           
 181. I appreciate Professor Black for raising this intriguing new, subtle wrinkle with 
me. He also brieﬂy notes this possibility in Derek W. Black, The Constitutional 
Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 
66–68) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). 
 182. See, e.g., Michael D. Hurd & Susann Rohwedder, Effects of the Financial Crisis 
and Great Recession on American Households 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 16407, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16407.pdf [http://perma.cc/J7KN-459Y] 
(finding “widespread” effects of the recession on American households); see also Melissa B. 
Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. Banking Inst. 115, 115–16 
(2009) (discussing bankruptcy reforms incident to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis). 
 183. See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 101.40. 
Estimated Total and School-Age Resident Populations, by State: Selected Years, 1970 Through 
2014 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_101.40.asp?current=yes 
[http://perma.cc/3DCS-GLKC]. 
 184. Id. 
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A comparatively decreasing appetite for traditional, “assigned” 
public schools raises important social, political, and economic issues for 
public schools and school officials. To the extent that any stigma 
previously existed for those families who, for whatever reason, opted out 
of their assigned public schools,185 that stigma attaching to families 
seeking schooling alternatives has dissipated, as non-assigned-public-
school and non-public-school attendance has increased, both in absolute 
and relative terms. 
Politically and economically, the stakes are even higher for public 
schools. While the politics surrounding school choice policies are 
anything but clear, political support for public schools remains 
important, indeed critical. Insofar as public school budgets are a 
function of a public’s willingness to tax itself, public schools’ ﬁnancial 
health depends on popular political support for public schools.186 
Families who opt out of public schools altogether likely absorb private 
school tuition on top of their property tax contributions, which help 
fund local public schools. As a result, their appetite to “invest” in local 
public schools likely diminishes, at least at the margins. 
To be sure, it remains important to note that property owners retain 
an economic incentive to support even those local public schools that 
their kids do not attend. After all, in many districts, including many 
affluent suburban districts, homeowners pay a premium for property 
located in a public school district beneﬁtting from a favorable repu-
tation.187 Given the direct economic relation between perceptions of 
public-school-district quality and property values, even property owners 
without school-age children or those with children who have opted out of 
public schools still have an important economic incentive to help ensure 
that positive perceptions of the assigned school district persist. 
These constantly evolving political, social, and economic dynamics 
help fuel political turbulence surrounding school choice that increasingly 
straddles traditional political labels and exhibits complex political 
                                                                                                                           
 185. See generally Diane Ravitch, Reign of Error: The Hoax of the Privatization 
Movement and the Danger to America’s Public Schools (2013) (arguing for an end to the 
privatization movement, which drains students and funding from public schools); David 
Cutler, The Private-School Stigma, Atlantic (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
education/archive/2015/01/bridging-private-and-public-schools/384673/ [http://perma.cc/ 
AG7Q-332H] (discussing ways in which the reform community viliﬁes non-public-school 
students and teachers). 
 186. See Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and 
Inequality, 104 Geo. L.J. Online 1, 8 (2015), http://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/ 
164/antitrust-competition-policy-inequality/pdf [http://perma.cc/H7MN-W4HB] (observing 
that “it has long been suggested that private schools reduce political support for larger public 
school budgets”). 
 187. See, e.g., William T. Bogart & Brian A. Cromwell, How Much More Is a Good 
School District Worth?, 50 Nat’l Tax J. 215, 230–31 (1997) (ﬁnding “high-quality school 
districts provide services valued in excess of the higher taxes that they levy”). 
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dynamics.188 To be sure, Republican administrations have been compar-
atively more hospitable to the idea of increased competition among 
schools, including public schools.189 One recent example is President 
Trump’s initial address to a joint session of Congress in January 2017, in 
which Trump made clear his Administration’s support for, among other 
education reforms, publicly funded voucher programs that expressly 
include homeschooling.190 The drive at the federal level for increased 
competition among schools is not conﬁned to Republican admin-
istrations, however. As Diane Ravitch, a staunch and vocal school choice 
critic, notes, the “Obama administration [was] just as enthusiastic about 
privately managed charter schools as the Republicans.”191 Consequently, 
contributing to the political complexities surrounding school choice is 
that traditional, reliable political “markers” increasingly do not provide 
much predictive force in the education context. 
III. WHAT A FOCUS ON TRADITIONAL EDUCATION FEDERALISM RISKS 
MISSING—AND WHY IT MATTERS 
An ongoing federalism “tug-of-war” between the federal and state 
governments, as well as among the federal branches, over education 
policy control shows no sign of abating anytime soon. Indeed, if 
anything, the juxtaposition of NCLB and ESSA, along with the contro-
versy surrounding the conﬁrmation of President Trump’s Secretary of 
Education, Betsy DeVos, makes quite clear that ﬁghts over education 
federalism boundaries are, if anything, heating up. These boundary 
ﬁghts, particularly in light of recent political turbulence, will also 
continue to attract scholarly and public attention. And, to be sure, the 
distribution of education policy authority—both horizontally and verti-
cally—deserves some attention, as who decides can often be as, if not more, 
important as what is decided. 
                                                                                                                           
 188. See, e.g., Ryan & Heise, supra note 9, at 2080–81 (discussing the under-
appreciated political resistance to voucher programs from many Republicans in affluent 
suburbs despite Republican leaders’ support for vouchers). 
 189. For example, past Republican administrations have pressed for publicly funded 
voucher programs that include private religious schools. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Senate 
Rejects Tuition Aid, a Key to Bush Education Plan, N.Y. Times (Jun. 13, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/13/us/senate-rejects-tuition-aid-a-key-to-bush-education- 
plan.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James 
E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 350–51 
(2001) (noting the Reagan and Bush Administrations’ general support for greater school 
choice, including public funding for parents who want to send their children to religious 
schools). 
 190. See Yamiche Alcindor, Trump’s Call for School Vouchers Is a Return to a 
Campaign Pledge, N.Y. Times (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/ 
us/politics/trump-school-vouchers-campaign-pledge.html?_r=0 (on ﬁle with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
 191. Ravitch, Private, supra note 136, at 58. 
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An undue focus on formal education federalism boundary disputes 
and the allocation and reallocation of policy control between federal and 
state governments, however, risks missing an equally and, potentially, 
more profound important structural shift in power. School choice, in all 
its various forms exercised by parents and students, continues to increase 
in both absolute and relative terms. One inevitable consequence of 
school choice policies is that they reduce governmental control over the 
education enterprise in a fundamental manner. An increase in school 
choice results in an unmistakable shift in power over critical educational 
decisions concerning elementary and secondary schooling away from 
government (at all levels) and toward parents and their schoolchildren. 
While reasonable people of good will can and do differ over the policy 
implications and wisdom of such a shift in authority, as a descriptive 
matter, evidence of this shift appears quite clear. Moreover, even school 
choice critics understand and acknowledge that parents have a legal 
authority to exercise their rights in ways that public school districts 
cannot.192 The resulting shift in control over school assignments from 
governments to parents possesses quite important implications for 
education federalism, albeit in an indirect manner. While control over 
education policy—particularly public education policy—can dramatically 
inﬂuence schools, as more parents gain control over where their kids go 
to schools, jurisdictional squabbles among governmental units over what 
happens within schools will decline in importance. 
Given the explosive market developments, homeschooling, with its 
potential to disrupt traditional education markets and further contribute 
to the diminished relevance of current education federalism turbulence, 
warrants particular attention. While it is difficult to accurately assess how 
the dramatic growth of quality online curricula and resources will 
continue to inform homeschooling’s popularity over time, a few points 
are already clear. First, at its core, education remains a labor-intensive 
activity, whether delivered in traditional schools or in the home. On this 
point, status quo largely endures, and homeschooling remains limited 
only to those who can absorb (or organize) and meet the intensive labor 
requirements. While technology, including online instruction, can 
reduce this burden, technology cannot—at least not yet—substantially 
eliminate the ﬁxed labor requirements. Technological developments can 
reduce, however, other traditional market barriers, including, for 
example, access to instructional material.193 The potentially signiﬁcant 
reduction of one traditional barrier to the homeschooling market will 
likely steepen homeschooling’s growth trend going forward. 
                                                                                                                           
 192. See, e.g., Julie F. Mead & Maria M. Lewis, The Implications of the Use of Parental 
Choice as a Legal “Circuit Breaker,” 53 Am. Educ. Res. J. 100, 100–01 (2016) (highlighting 
parental choice as a means of evading legal limitations on public actors and governmental 
authorities). 
 193. To reference just one obvious example: Access to the Internet now makes available 
a growing plethora of high-quality learning material. 
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To argue, as this Essay does, that increased school choice will 
diminish the comparative importance of education federalism squabbles 
is not to argue that education federalism will become unimportant. 
Obviously, and for good reasons, federalism boundaries matter, as they 
should, and they will continue to matter in the education context and 
elsewhere. On the horizontal axis, important questions about whether 
education policy is or should be primarily an executive or legislative 
function will persist. President Trump’s recent decision to formally withdraw 
a “Dear Colleague” letter concerning transgender school-bathroom 
access is one recent example of this ongoing structural separation of 
power tension and one that has already yielded palpable legal and policy 
consequences.194 To the extent that both branches will continue to partic-
ipate, ﬁghts over policy control between Congress and the Executive 
Branch will not go away, particularly when political control over Congress 
and the presidency is divided between Republicans and Democrats. 
Similarly, as the quick transition from NCLB to ESSA amply 
illustrates, analogous fights over education policy will endure between the 
federal and state governments (and, in a similar manner, between state 
governments and local school districts). The evolving composition of 
school budgets from federal, state, and local sources contributes to and, 
indeed, exacerbates vertical separation of power tensions.195 
CONCLUSION 
Acknowledging that education federalism concerns will likely—and 
appropriately—endure, however, does not diminish this Essay’s central 
point: that a focus on education federalism and its related squabbles risks 
missing a critical shift in education control occasioned by increased 
demand and capacity for school choice, broadly deﬁned. School choice 
shifts fundamental power from governments at all levels to parents and 
their schoolchildren. Such a move restructures the balance of power 
between governments and citizens with respect to school attendance and 
materially disrupts a status quo that structurally favors public school 
attendance. 
Given the importance of education to an individual’s ability to 
participate fully in the nation’s economic, political, and social realms, 
that states compel some amount of education is unremarkable.196 Equally 
unremarkable, however, is that our constitutional values, expressed by 
the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, allow individuals the ability to 
                                                                                                                           
 194. See supra section I.B.1. 
 195. See supra Table 1. 
 196. For a tabular summary of state compulsory education laws as of 2015, see Nat’l 
Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, State Readiness and Progress Through School: Table 5.1. 
Compulsory School Attendance Laws, Minimum and Maximum Age Limits for Required 
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discharge their affirmative schooling obligations through public- and 
non-public-school attendance.197 The distribution of families able to fully 
exercise their Pierce rights, however, predictably skews in a direction that 
favors the wealthy over the poor.198 To the extent that school choice 
policies increase education autonomy for a greater number and percent-
age of families, a corresponding shift in power from governments to 
families will result. 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 197. 268 U.S. 510, 534–45 (1925) (holding that a statute may not constitutionally 
require that children receive their mandatory schooling from only public schooling). 
 198. Another variant of families exercising their “Pierce rights” is when those families 
with the economic ability to do so select to live in districts with high-performing public 
schools. Not surprisingly, such districts typically correlate with comparatively higher prop-
erty values. See Bogart & Cromwell, supra note 187, at 231. 
